戈德斯坦论台海：美国现实主义的警讯与矛盾

美国战略学者、华盛顿智库“国防优先”组织亚洲项目负责人戈德斯坦（Lyle J. Goldstein）10月23日在《时代》双周刊发表了一篇题为《美国必须提防台湾鲁莽的领导人》的分析文章，引发了广泛的关注和讨论。

在评论中，他认为台湾可能成为全球最危险的地缘冲突点，强调美国应避免卷入台海冲突，呼吁川普政府回归更为严格的一中政策，并批评台湾领导人的“鲁莽”行径可能将美国拖入危险的战争。这一系列观点虽然并不代表川普政府的官方立场，却折射出美国战略界内部的深层次思考与分歧和对未来台海政策的焦虑。

戈德斯坦的立场属于典型的“现实主义”范畴，主张美国将国家利益置于对外介入之上。他认为，美国应避免因台湾问题与中国发生直接冲突，特别是在经历了长期海外军事介入（如伊拉克与阿富汗战争）之后，公众对战争的疲惫感愈发明显，民意基础与财政资源都难以支撑另一场潜在的高强度冲突。美国社会，特别是其民众，已经对无休止的海外军事干预产生了反感。戈德斯坦警告说，台海冲突可能引发一场美国无法承受的全面战争，尤其是在台湾领导人可能采取的激进策略下，美国应避免被拖入这样一场不必要的冲突。 这种立场在学界与部分政策圈内颇具共鸣，也反映出“美国优先”思维在外交安全领域的延伸。

然而，尽管戈德斯坦的观点从现实主义角度出发，“合理性不容忽视”，但它在美国实际的对台政策中并没有直接体现。在川普政府任内，尽管其政策强调“美国优先”，美国对台的军事和外交支持却明显加强——包括通过《台湾旅行法》以及加大军售力度等。美国对台湾的支持，更多地源自地缘政治考量——在与中国日益激烈的竞争中，台湾被视为一种战略杠杆。正因为如此，戈德斯坦所主张的“回归一中政策”，虽然理论上符合现实主义的逻辑，却几乎不可能在当前的美国政治和国际局势下得到采纳。

从台湾的角度来看，戈德斯坦的主张不禁让人深思。他提醒台湾在加深与美国的安全合作时，不能过度依赖美国的长期承诺。美国的对台政策，始终是建立在自身国家利益基础之上的，任何变化的国际形势或国内政治风向，都可能使这一政策发生调整。虽然台美关系日益紧密，但这并不意味着美国会无条件地为台湾提供军事支持，或一定会在台海发生军事冲突时军事介入。对台湾来说，提升自我防卫能力并保持战略灵活性，仍然是避免陷入不确定局势的关键。

这一辩论也反映了美国国内战略思潮的分裂。美国战略界在对华政策上分为三大阵营：鹰派主张明确承诺协防台湾，现实主义者主张保持战略模糊以避免冲突，而孤立主义者则希望减少对外干预，聚焦国内事务。戈德斯坦所代表的“谨慎派”或“反思派”在当前的政策讨论中尚处于少数，但随着全球战略环境的变化，尤其是美中竞争的加剧，这一立场或许将在未来政策中占据更为重要的地位。

美国对台政策的复杂性与不确定性，亦反映出一个更广泛的现象：在全球力量格局变动的背景下，大国战略的选择从未像今天这样充满不确定性。戈德斯坦的论述虽然并非主流，但它为人们提供了一个“清醒”的视角，提醒各方“理性”审视台海问题背后的风险与潜在成本。对于台湾而言，这无疑是一个警告——在全球大国博弈中，任何形式的安全承诺都不应被视为绝对。

总的来说，戈德斯坦的警示，虽然或许过于悲观，但却在一定程度上揭示了美国战略界对台海局势的复杂判断与多元声音。这不仅是对美国内部分歧的反映，也是一个关于如何应对未来不确定性的警钟。戈德斯坦的观点为台海局势提供了一面镜子。它揭示了美国内部对台政策的矛盾与摇摆，也提醒台湾与国际社会，所谓的“安全承诺”从来不是铁板一块。现实主义的冷静思考，也许并不令人愉快，却可能是理解未来台海风险与美中互动的必要前提。

28.10.2025

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参考资料

Goldstein, Lyle. The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader: https://time.com/7304818/us-china-taiwan-independence-lai/.

关于 Donald J. Trump 政府（2025 年）或其顾问团队在台海政策方面的 “草案／内部讨论” 相关摘要：1）一份题为 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance 的内部备忘录（2025 年 3 月由 Pete Hegseth 签署）提出：将 Taiwan 海峡可能被 People’s Republic of China 强行夺取作为“主节奏情景”（pacing scenario）之一  (taipeitimes.com)。在该文件中，“拒止（denial）防御”策略被提及：美国将强化印太地区基地、增加无人舰艇、潜艇、专门部队，以备对台湾相关事态 (taipeitimes.com)。该备忘录似指出：台湾问题已成为美国国防部关注的关键定位，而不仅仅是传统意义上的“盟友支持”情形 (The Washington Post)。

2）关于政策语言与官方声明的变化：一篇报道指出，2025 年 2 月，美国 U.S. State Department 网站将 “美国不支持台湾独立” 这一措辞删除，引起中方强烈不满 (New York Post)。另一报道提及：2025 年 7 月，美国政府取消了与台湾防长的会谈，官方理由为“伊朗打击关联”但分析认为此举与台美／中美关系及峰会安排有关 (Financial Times)。

3）关于台湾自身防卫与支出方面的美国顾问建议：在 2025 年 3 月， Elbridge Colby（被提名为美国国防部政策副部长）在其确认听证会上建议：台湾防卫开支应提升至其 GDP 的约 10% (Reuters)。


Goldstein on the Taiwan Strait: A Warning and Contradiction of American Realism

On October 23, American strategist Lyle J. Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities, published an analysis in TIME titled “The U.S. Must Beware of Reckless Leaders in Taiwan.” The article sparked widespread attention and debate.

In his commentary, Goldstein argues that Taiwan may become the world’s most dangerous geopolitical flashpoint and stresses that the United States should avoid becoming entangled in a cross-strait conflict. He calls on the Trump administration to return to a stricter One-China policy and warns that the “reckless behavior” of Taiwan’s leadership could drag the U.S. into a perilous war. Although these views do not represent the official position of the Trump administration, they reflect deep divisions and anxieties within the U.S. strategic community regarding the future of its Taiwan policy.

Goldstein’s position belongs to the realist school of thought, which prioritizes national interests over external intervention. He argues that the U.S. should avoid direct confrontation with China over Taiwan, especially after decades of overseas military engagements such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have left the American public war-weary. With limited fiscal and political will to support another high-intensity conflict, the American people have grown increasingly skeptical of endless foreign entanglements. Goldstein warns that a Taiwan Strait conflict could trigger a full-scale war the U.S. cannot afford—particularly if Taiwan’s leadership adopts radical strategies. He urges Washington to avoid being drawn into an unnecessary and potentially catastrophic conflict.

This realist perspective has found resonance among some academics and policymakers and reflects an extension of the “America First” mindset into the realm of foreign and security policy.

However, while Goldstein’s argument may be “rational and difficult to dismiss” from a realist standpoint, it has not been reflected in actual U.S. policy toward Taiwan. During the Trump administration, despite its emphasis on “America First,” U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taiwan significantly increased—through measures such as the Taiwan Travel Act and expanded arms sales. U.S. backing for Taiwan has been driven primarily by geopolitical calculation: in the intensifying competition with China, Taiwan is viewed as a strategic lever. For this reason, Goldstein’s proposal to “return to a strict One-China policy,” though theoretically consistent with realist logic, is almost impossible to adopt under the current political and international circumstances.

From Taiwan’s perspective, Goldstein’s warning is worth reflection. He reminds Taiwan that in deepening security cooperation with the United States, it should not over-rely on Washington’s long-term commitment. U.S. policy toward Taiwan has always been grounded in American national interests, and shifting international or domestic political dynamics could alter it at any time. Although U.S.–Taiwan relations have grown closer, this does not mean the U.S. will unconditionally defend Taiwan or necessarily intervene militarily if conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait. For Taiwan, enhancing self-defense capabilities and maintaining strategic flexibility remain key to avoiding entrapment in uncertainty.

This debate also reflects divergent strategic schools of thought within the United States. The American strategic community is generally divided into three camps regarding China policy:

• Hawks, who advocate explicit military commitments to defend Taiwan;
• Realists, who favor maintaining strategic ambiguity to prevent escalation; and
• Isolationists, who call for reduced foreign intervention and a focus on domestic priorities.

Goldstein represents the “cautious” or “reflective” faction, which remains a minority view in current policy discussions. However, as the global strategic environment evolves and U.S.–China competition intensifies, his perspective may gain greater influence in future policymaking.

The complexity and uncertainty of U.S. Taiwan policy reflect a broader phenomenon: amid shifting global power dynamics, great-power strategy has never been more uncertain. Goldstein’s argument, while not mainstream, offers a sobering perspective that urges rational assessment of the risks and potential costs behind the Taiwan Strait issue. For Taiwan, it serves as a warning—no form of security commitment in great-power rivalry should be seen as absolute.

In conclusion, Goldstein’s warning—though perhaps overly pessimistic—nonetheless highlights the nuanced and often conflicting judgments within the U.S. strategic establishment regarding the Taiwan Strait. It mirrors the divisions inside Washington and sounds an alarm about how to navigate an uncertain future. Goldstein’s analysis provides a mirror for the Taiwan Strait situation: it reveals the contradictions and vacillation in America’s Taiwan policy and reminds Taiwan and the international community alike that security assurances are never ironclad. Realist sobriety may be uncomfortable, but it is likely a necessary prerequisite for understanding future risks in the Taiwan Strait and the dynamics of U.S.–China interaction.

Reference

Goldstein, Lyle. The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader: https://time.com/7304818/us-china-taiwan-independence-lai/.

Summary of Drafts/Internal Discussions on Taiwan Strait Policy under the Donald J. Trump Administration (2025) or its Advisory Team:

1. An internal memorandum titled Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance (signed by Pete Hegseth in March 2025) proposed treating the potential forcible takeover of the Taiwan Strait by the People’s Republic of China as one of the “pacing scenarios” (taipeitimes.com). The document mentions a “denial defense” strategy: the United States would strengthen bases in the Indo-Pacific region, increase unmanned vessels, submarines, and specialized forces in preparation for contingencies related to Taiwan (taipeitimes.com). The memorandum appears to indicate that the Taiwan issue has become a central focus of the U.S. Department of Defense, rather than merely a matter of “ally support” in the traditional sense (The Washington Post).
2. On changes in policy language and official statements: one report noted that in February 2025, the U.S. State Department website deleted the phrase “The United States does not support Taiwan independence,” which triggered strong dissatisfaction from Beijing (New York Post). Another report mentioned that in July 2025, the U.S. government canceled a meeting with Taiwan’s defense minister. The official reason given was “Iran strike-related,” but analysts suggested the move was connected to U.S.-Taiwan/China-U.S. relations and summit arrangements (Financial Times).
3. On U.S. advisory recommendations regarding Taiwan’s self-defense and expenditures: in March 2025, Elbridge Colby (nominated as U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy) suggested during his confirmation hearing that Taiwan’s defense spending should be raised to about 10% of its GDP (Reuters).