Does the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei mean Iran will immediately undergo a “regime change”?

U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have both publicly claimed that Khamenei has died, asserting that his body has been found and portraying this as a major victory against the Iranian regime. The news was later publicly confirmed by Iranian state media. Does Khamenei’s death mean that Iran will now experience political upheaval leading to an immediate change of regime?

Khamenei’s death will lead to a rapid change in leadership, but not necessarily to reformists taking power. Iran’s political system includes a built‑in succession mechanism. The Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, which typically favors candidates from conservative religious or military circles. Public analyses (including U.S. intelligence assessments) have predicted that if Khamenei dies, his successor is likely to come from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the hardline religious conservative camp, rather than from moderate reformists. This means that even if leadership changes, the regime’s core ideology and foreign policy may remain hardline, especially on national security and religious legitimacy.

Furthermore, the post‑Khamenei government may become even more centered around the military and the IRGC. The IRGC and its associated security institutions are already extremely powerful within Iran. If a power vacuum emerges, the IRGC may use its organizational and military advantages to consolidate control quickly, rather than being replaced by a popular movement. In times of crisis, military or paramilitary structures are more likely to preserve the status quo than to promote democratization or large‑scale reforms.

Additionally, the death of a top leader does not automatically mean the collapse of the regime. Iran’s system is built on deep religious and legal foundations. The position of Supreme Leader is not only political but also carries religious authority. Political alternatives are tightly controlled by the Assembly of Experts and conservative elites.

Although Iran has seen large‑scale protests in recent months—driven by economic hardship and rising ethnic grievances—and many demonstrators have indeed called for the overthrow of the regime, these protests can only translate into institutional change if they achieve broad organization, elite fragmentation, and unified strategy. This is extremely difficult to achieve in the short term. The IRGC is deeply tied to the regime and functions as an “ideological army,” not a neutral national military. In a crisis, it is more likely to suppress unrest than to stand aside. While protests exist, religious legitimacy still holds among parts of the population, especially in rural and conservative communities. Thus, although regime legitimacy has weakened, it has not collapsed.

More importantly, war and external pressure can themselves increase instability. Regardless of whether Khamenei or other senior leaders have died, U.S. and Israeli military strikes may heighten domestic fears and anti‑foreign sentiment. Anti‑government protests may become intertwined with anti‑external‑intervention sentiment, and the conservative leadership may use wartime mobilization to strengthen internal control and suppress dissent. Historically, many countries facing external military threats tend to consolidate power around existing leaders, strengthen conservative factions, and emphasize internal unity rather than fragmenting.

Overall, even if Khamenei dies, the likelihood of Iran’s system collapsing in the short term, the regime immediately disintegrating, or a democratic government emerging right away is low (though not impossible). Power is more likely to shift to another religious or military conservative figure. Iran’s internal political trajectory depends on a balance of multiple forces—the Assembly of Experts, the IRGC, public protests, economic pressure—rather than on the presence or absence of a single leader. Iran’s power structure is highly institutionalized and has formed an “inheritable theocratic system,” not a personal dictatorship. The IRGC possesses organizational advantages such as armed force, economic resources, and rapid mobilization capacity.

Historical experience shows that public influence tends to become decisive only after elite fragmentation. Authoritarian regimes typically collapse not because street protests directly overthrow them, but because elites split, regional leaders defect, and central control breaks down. Only if Iran faces a succession crisis and factional conflict within the IRGC might mass mobilization and street protests become decisive.

A true “regime change” in Iran usually requires three conditions to occur simultaneously: elite fragmentation (serious conflict between religious leadership and the IRGC, or splits within the IRGC that undermine its willingness to suppress unrest), complete economic collapse (hyperinflation, fiscal breakdown, mass unemployment), and large‑scale, sustained public protests occurring alongside simultaneous external and internal pressures. None of these conditions can be missing.

In other words, even if the Supreme Leader dies, Iran is more likely to experience “power reconsolidation, a harder line, and increased militarization” rather than “immediate democratization, systemic collapse, or the rise of a pro‑Western government.”

The key variables that will shape Iran’s future include whether the succession plan is clear, whether factionalism emerges within the IRGC, whether the economy enters a state of uncontrollable decline, and whether elite families begin transferring assets abroad. These factors matter more than street protests.

01.03.2026