The "Inward Turn" of the Trump Administration's Defense Strategy and the Reshaping of the US-China-Taiwan Security Landscape
In September 2025, US President Donald John Trump signed an executive order renaming the "Department of Defense" to the "Department of War," simultaneously releasing a new draft defense strategy. This move marked a significant shift in US strategic philosophy and military doctrine. The renaming of the Department of Defense symbolized a reorientation of US military culture, reflecting the Trump administration's trend towards "inwardness" in global strategic deployment—emphasizing domestic defense and Western Hemisphere security while downplaying concerns about the threat from China. This article analyzes the far-reaching impact of this strategic shift on US-China relations, cross-Strait security, and the global military order, revealing how the US, under the "America First" principle, is redefining its international role and security commitments.
I. What
Strategic Changes Are Implied by the Trump Administration's Renaming of the
"Department of Defense" and Its New Draft Defense Strategy?
Trump's decision to rename the US Department of Defense to the
"Department of War" aims to intensify the focus on military culture,
combat readiness, and the defense of national interests, signaling a policy
direction toward military intervention and combat readiness in the years ahead.
This move is expected to have a profound impact on US military culture, potentially
altering US military policy and foreign strategy to some extent.
The renaming of the Department of Defense and the introduction of the new
draft defense strategy represent clear intersections in policy orientation,
reflecting some of the Trump administration's strategic shifts in military and
foreign policy. From the new defense strategy draft, it is evident that US
military operations will undergo key changes, particularly in adjusting its
international security responsibilities, shifting strategic priorities, and
reorganizing military deployments.
The new defense strategy draft shifts the US focus to domestic defense
and Western Hemisphere security, while reducing the perceived threat from
China. This marks a significant departure from the "National Defense
Strategy" introduced by the Trump administration in 2018, which focused on
containing China. The core idea of the new draft strategy emphasizes that the
US should reduce its military commitments to international affairs, gradually
shifting more security responsibilities to allies, while focusing on
safeguarding its homeland and the Western Hemisphere.
The "Homeland and Western Hemisphere First" goal in the new
strategy indicates that the US will begin reallocating military resources and
strategic focus to defend its homeland security and strengthen military defense
in Latin America, especially the Caribbean region, and North America. This
aligns with Trump’s earlier "America First" doctrine, reflecting a
stronger tendency toward isolationism, especially in terms of military
commitments. This is in line with the renaming of the Department of Defense to
the "Department of War," symbolizing a shift toward a military
culture centered on defending national interests and preparing for combat, rather
than merely relying on defense.
The new defense strategy emphasizes a reduction in US military
deployments in Europe and the Middle East, consistent with Trump's longstanding
isolationist stance. He has advocated for decreasing military interventions
overseas to allow the US to concentrate more resources on addressing domestic
threats and reinforcing defense within the Western Hemisphere. This strategic
pivot is closely tied to the renaming of the "Department of War," as
Trump attempts to reinforce a culture of proactive warfare and defense of
national interests rather than excessive reliance on international cooperation
or military alliances.
According to the draft, the US military will withdraw some of its forces
from Europe and the Middle East, while reducing support for security assistance
programs. This indicates that the US will scale back its global military
presence, particularly in traditional regions where it confronts China and
Russia. This shift contrasts with the symbolic emphasis on military advantage suggested
by the renaming of the Department of War. Trump appears to be signaling through
this cultural and structural adjustment that the US intends to reduce its
global military responsibilities, while focusing more on self-defense and
regional security.
The new defense strategy draft reduces the emphasis on the threat from
China, meaning that the US will adopt a more strategic defense approach rather
than an all-out containment policy in dealing with China and Russia. For China
and Russia, this shift in strategy may be seen as a temporary strategic
retreat. While Trump remains verbally hardline toward both countries, the new
strategy and adjustments in military focus indicate a de-escalation in US
confrontational actions, particularly in terms of global military
interventions.
This shift creates greater uncertainty for the US's traditional allies,
particularly in Europe and the Middle East. Such uncertainty may lead to
military power vacuums in certain regions, presenting strategic opportunities
for other great powers like China and Russia.
In short, the renaming of the Department of Defense and the release of
the new defense strategy draft indicate that the Trump administration is
attempting to achieve a strategic transformation: reducing US military commitments
globally, concentrating efforts on defending the homeland and Western
Hemisphere, and using symbolic name changes to reinforce the "fighting
spirit" of the military and a domestic-first strategic mindset. In the
short term, this shift will likely reduce US cooperation with traditional
allies and global deployments, but in the long term, it will create different
strategic impacts on adversaries such as China and Russia, potentially
encouraging their regional expansion efforts.
II. Does
the Trump Administration's New Defense Strategy Signal a Decrease in the
Centrality of US-China Confrontation in America's Military Strategy?
As mentioned earlier, the new draft defense strategy proposed by the
Trump administration reflects a strategic shift, particularly in the relative
de-escalation of US-China confrontation. From the content of the draft, it is
clear that confronting China or addressing the Chinese threat is no longer the
core or priority of US foreign strategic deployments, having been replaced by other
issues such as homeland defense and Western Hemisphere security.
The new defense strategy draft lowers the priority of containing China's
threat, signaling that the US no longer considers confrontation with China as
its sole or most important foreign strategic goal. While Trump continues to
criticize China, especially in economic, trade, and technological areas, from a
military perspective, addressing the Chinese threat is no longer the exclusive
focus, as military confrontation with China not only carries immense costs but
is also fraught with challenges, making it ultimately unwise.
The new draft strategy indicates that US military interventions and
overseas deployments will be reduced globally. This shift means that the US is
more inclined to decrease its military presence in Asia and other regions,
avoiding long-term external military engagements. The Trump administration
likely believes that, as domestic security threats (such as terrorism)
diminish, it would be more advantageous for the US to allocate more resources
to homeland defense and strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. This
shift somewhat suggests that the US no longer views China as its greatest
threat.
This strategic shift will allow China's influence in Asia to gradually
increase, especially if the US military reduces or withdraws its presence in
the Asia-Pacific region. China's military expansion and regional security
threats will become more prominent, and the US "withdrawal" strategy
will indirectly provide China with more opportunities to expand its strategic
footprint in the region.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
2025 report, the number of US military deployments in the Indo-Pacific region
has decreased by approximately 12% since 2020. For example, US forces in Japan
have been reduced by around 4,500 personnel, and US forces in South Korea have
decreased by approximately 3,200 personnel. These figures show that the US
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is gradually shrinking, providing
space for China to expand its strategy in the region. Meanwhile, China's
defense budget reached 2.1 trillion yuan in 2025, increasing by 7.6%, with a
continued rise in expenditures on the Navy and Air Force. This indicates that
China is strengthening its regional projection capabilities, especially in
military deployments around the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Although the new strategy draft downplays military attention to the
Chinese threat, Trump still sees China as a competitor and maintains a hardline
stance on China, especially in trade, technology, and military competition.
However, there is a contradiction between his tough rhetoric and the
adjustments in military strategy. While Trump continues to criticize China
publicly, the actual strategic deployment has shifted away from making the
Chinese threat the primary focus of the US military.
The Trump administration’s renaming of the Department of Defense to the
"Department of War" may not fully align with the strategic shift
(reduction in strategy), but this symbolic action helps reinforce the
military’s "preparedness for battle" mentality. However, the military
culture and strategic content embodied by the new name (such as the attitude
toward the Chinese threat) exhibit some discrepancies. Renaming the department
to the "Department of War" may be aimed at encouraging a stronger
military culture, particularly the ability to respond to unknown threats,
rather than a singular focus on a specific country (such as China).
The proposal of the new defense strategy suggests that the Trump
administration leans toward a limited interventionism strategy. Trump may
believe that the current international environment no longer poses a direct
threat to the US homeland, allowing the US to reduce its global military
burdens and focus more resources on domestic development. In this context, the
Chinese threat may be viewed as a long-term strategic challenge, rather than an
immediate emergency. The US may adjust its military strategy in the short term,
focusing more on security protection in other regions (such as the Caribbean
and South America).
Isolationism is one of the core policies of the Trump administration,
particularly in the early years of his presidency. By reducing military
commitments abroad and reliance on allies, Trump sought to lower US military
spending globally and shift more resources toward addressing domestic economic
and social issues. This strategy means the US would be more likely to adopt a
defensive posture, rather than actively participating in global military
confrontations, especially regarding China.
In summary, the new defense strategy draft indicates that, in the short
term, the US will no longer consider US-China confrontation as the core of its
military strategy. Addressing the Chinese threat has been relegated to a lower
priority, and the US strategic focus has shifted to homeland defense and
Western Hemisphere security, aligning with Trump's "America First"
policy and isolationist ideology. Although military adjustments have been made,
the US-China confrontation remains central to American economic and diplomatic
policies. If this strategy is adopted, it will mark a major shift in US
military and foreign policy, especially in terms of a contraction of military
deployments in Asia and globally, with Trump's tough rhetoric continuing in the
short term but focusing more on homeland and Western Hemisphere defense.
III.
Does This Strategic Shift Also Imply a Reduction in the US's Defense Commitment
to Taiwan, Even to the Point of Not Directly Engaging Militarily if China
Invades Taiwan?
The adjustments in the Trump administration’s new defense strategy,
especially the shift in focus toward homeland defense and Western Hemisphere
security, may suggest that the US's defense commitment to Taiwan will be
affected. This strategic shift may lower the US's direct military intervention
commitment in the event of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan.
According to the new defense strategy draft, the Trump administration’s
strategic focus has shifted from global military interventions to homeland
defense and Western Hemisphere security. This implies that the US will reduce
its military presence and involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. In the past,
the US's military presence in the Asia-Pacific, especially its defense
commitment to Taiwan, was a key component of its strategy. However, under the
current strategic framework, the US may reduce its military investments in the
region and the likelihood of direct intervention. The US has made an "informal
security commitment" to Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979),
which pledges to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons but does not explicitly
commit to direct military intervention if China launches an armed attack on
Taiwan. Strategically, the Trump administration tends to reduce overseas
military interventions, especially in regions that do not directly relate to US
homeland security.
Trump's "America First" policy emphasizes reducing military
interventions globally and cutting military commitments to the security of
other countries, particularly those far from US shores. If this mindset extends
to the Taiwan issue, the Trump administration might be inclined to reduce
military intervention when China takes military action, relying more on diplomatic
pressure or other means (such as maintaining a level of military aid).
Moreover, the emphasis on the security responsibilities of allies in the new
defense strategy also means that the US will no longer bear all security
responsibilities but will expect allies (such as Taiwan and other Asia-Pacific
nations) to take on more of their own defense responsibilities. This strategy
would place Taiwan under greater security pressure, as US military support
would no longer be as firm as before.
A key shift in the new strategy draft is the reduced emphasis on the
Chinese threat, with the US turning its focus to homeland defense and Western
Hemisphere security, rather than viewing China as the greatest threat. This
means that when China threatens Taiwan with military force, the US response may
not be as direct and swift as in the past. This is reflected not only in
reduced military support for Taiwan but also in the reduction of US military
deployments in the Asia-Pacific, limiting America’s ability and willingness to
directly intervene in Taiwan's affairs.
Although Trump’s renaming of the Department of Defense to the
"Department of War" symbolizes a focus on military preparedness
rather than direct engagement in every global conflict, it seems that Trump
would likely prefer to use diplomatic and economic pressure (such as sanctions)
to address China’s military threats, rather than direct military intervention.
Trump and his Defense Secretary, Mark Esper, have stated that the military
should focus on "combat capabilities" and "warrior spirit,"
rather than excessive involvement in the affairs of other nations. This
philosophy implies that the primary mission of US military forces is to defend
national interests, with Taiwan’s issue being resolved more through other means
(such as diplomacy, legal, or economic tools).
As the US shifts its strategic focus to homeland defense and Western
Hemisphere security, it may ask Taiwan to adopt more proactive self-defense
measures—rather than relying on direct US military intervention—to cope with
military pressure from China. This strategic adjustment could lead to a gradual
reduction in US defense support for Taiwan, particularly in terms of military
deployments and direct intervention, leaving Taiwan more vulnerable to strategic
isolation. This shift would mean that Taiwan will need to rely more on its own
military defense capabilities and strengthen its diplomatic and security
cooperation with the US and other countries to secure its survival space in the
face of Chinese pressure.
IV. Does
This Mean That the US Believes Losing Taiwan Would Not Pose a Severe Threat to
Its Homeland Security?
The shift in the Trump administration’s new defense strategy hints at the
possibility that the US may believe losing Taiwan would not pose a direct or
serious threat to its homeland security. This mindset reflects a broader
adjustment in the US strategic focus, which now prioritizes homeland defense
and Western Hemisphere security over global intervention.
Traditionally, US military strategy has considered how global military
dynamics affect the security of the American homeland. In the past, Taiwan’s
geographic location and strategic importance were seen as critical to
countering China’s rise, particularly in preventing the Chinese Navy and Air
Force from controlling the Western Pacific, which could threaten the US's
freedom of action in the region. However, the Trump administration’s strategic
shift suggests that the priority of homeland security has been further
amplified, leading to the belief that the loss of Taiwan would not directly
impact US homeland security. Strategically, the US may view Taiwan as an
important defense line in the Asia-Pacific, but one that does not pose an
immediate security threat to the American homeland (i.e., direct military
aggression against the US). Even if Taiwan were to fall under Chinese control,
the US could still ensure its security through global deployments and military
deterrence.
In the past, the US considered the security of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly
the Taiwan issue, as one of the key points in limiting China’s rise. But under
the new strategic framework, the Trump administration may believe that even if
China were to control Taiwan, as long as US homeland security remains
unaffected, there would be no need for excessive intervention. The US’s
"global policeman" role is being diminished, meaning the US may not
commit significant military resources to Taiwan’s defense, especially if there
is no direct threat to the US homeland.
Although China may gain control over Taiwan, the Trump administration
might argue that the US can still maintain strategic deterrence against China
through military power projection, nuclear deterrence, and support from global
allies. Even if Taiwan is no longer a strategic springboard, the US can rely on
its global military bases, nuclear arsenal, and advanced military technologies
to maintain a powerful influence worldwide. Therefore, losing Taiwan would not
directly threaten US territorial defense, though it could impact America’s
strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region. However, this may not be
considered the most critical strategic goal by the Trump administration.
For the Trump administration, the Taiwan issue is more of a geopolitical
concern than a direct US homeland security issue. The administration's strategy
is based on an assessment of the global situation, believing that the US’s
international influence and economic advantages are sufficient to address the
strategic consequences of China controlling Taiwan. The US may recognize that
losing Taiwan could affect its leadership and influence in the Asia-Pacific,
but it would not directly threaten homeland security.
Even if the US reduces its military commitment to Taiwan, this does not
mean that US strategic containment of China would be relaxed. The Trump
administration would maintain a hardline stance toward China, but it would
likely favor using diplomatic tools or regional military cooperation to
indirectly constrain China’s actions, rather than direct military intervention
in Taiwan. For example, the US has increased its military support to the
Indo-Pacific region and strengthened cooperation with countries like Japan,
South Korea, and Australia to ensure strategic deterrence against China,
ensuring that China does not take aggressive actions regarding Taiwan.
V. Conclusion:
The Interaction Logic Reshaping the US Defense Transformation and the
US-China-Taiwan Triangle Relations
The adjustments in the US defense strategy, particularly the reduction of
global military deployments and the inward-turning shift of strategic
priorities, signify a transition from post-Cold War global interventionism to a
model of limited intervention and regional defense. This shift in strategic
paradigm reflects not only the US’s considerations regarding resource
allocation, domestic political pressures, and the reconstruction of alliances,
but it also has profound implications for its strategic posture in the
Indo-Pacific, especially regarding the security architecture of the Taiwan
Strait.
In this context, the interactive logic of the US-China-Taiwan triangle is
undergoing a reshaping. If the US’s military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
and its commitment to Taiwan’s security weaken, particularly regarding the
possibility of military intervention, it will prompt China to adopt a more
proactive strategic posture on regional security issues. This could include
strengthening its military presence, expanding gray zone operations, and using
joint exercises and blockade tactics to apply pressure.
Taiwan, on the other hand, will need to seek a new balance between
strategic autonomy and security dependence. It must strengthen its domestic
defense system, enhance asymmetric warfare capabilities, and build a
diversified network of security partners through diplomacy to address the
potential strategic vacuum. While the US Taiwan Relations Act still provides a
certain level of security assurance, its "informal" nature and
strategic ambiguity force Taiwan to reassess its security dependency structure
when facing potential military threats from mainland China.
The future evolution of the Taiwan Strait situation will depend on the
interplay of multiple variables: whether the US can maintain credible
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific while reducing its global military commitments,
whether China will adjust its Taiwan policy to gain regional strategic
advantage, and whether Taiwan possesses sufficient institutional resilience and
strategic flexibility to cope with rapid changes in the external security
environment. In an era where the global power structure is increasingly
multipolar and geopolitical competition is intensifying, the Taiwan Strait
issue is no longer an isolated regional conflict but a key node in global
strategic stability and the reconstruction of the institutional order. It
requires continuous theoretical attention and policy response.
----------------
Related
materials and information sources:
- SIPRI.
(2025). SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International
Security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved
from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/yb25_summary_ch.pdf
- United
States Congress. (1979). Taiwan Relations Act. Public Law 96-8.
Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479
- White
House Archives. (2020). National Security Strategy of the United States
of America. Trump
Administration. Retrieved from https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov
- 腾讯新闻述策团队 (2025年9月22日) : 美国印太战区陆军军力评估报告（2025年版）,腾讯新闻. 取自
https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250922A01ZBH00
- 参考网. (2024年6月12日). 美国印太军事基地体系调整的特点、动因与趋势，取自
https://www.fx361.cc/page/2024/0612/24190309.shtml
- Defense
One. (2025). Trump Signs Executive Order Renaming Pentagon to
Department of War. Retrieved
from https://www.defenseone.com
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(2025). Trump’s New Defense Strategy: Isolationism Rebranded. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com
- Foreign
Policy. (2025). America’s Retreat: What Trump’s Defense Shift Means for
Allies. Retrieved from
https://foreignpolicy.com
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