Israel and the United States both appear to be signaling that the war with Iran may “end” in the short term

On the evening of March 20, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in a televised news briefing that nearly three weeks after the joint Israeli‑U.S. airstrikes began, Iran’s capabilities had been significantly weakened. “We are winning; Iran is being destroyed,” he declared. Iran, he claimed, no longer possesses the ability to enrich uranium or produce ballistic missiles. The war, he said, will end “much faster than people imagine.”

U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social that he is considering scaling back the scope of military strikes against Iran. He emphasized that the United States is close to achieving its objectives in this war, that it will not assume responsibility for securing the Strait of Hormuz, and that this responsibility should fall on the countries that use the waterway.

From an optimistic perspective, both Israel and the United States seem inclined to seek a “symbolic victory” in the near term. Netanyahu’s remarks suggest that Israel may be looking for a dignified exit—one that allows it to stop after achieving its core military objective of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has already asked Israel to “pause further attacks on Iran’s South Pars gas field,” and Netanyahu has said he is complying. This indicates that U.S. preferences are the key variable determining the duration of the war. If the Trump administration does not want to be drawn into a prolonged conflict, Israel will find it difficult to expand the war unilaterally.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth confirmed at a press briefing on Iran war funding that the Pentagon plans to request an additional $200 billion from Congress. But the move has drawn criticism and opposition from both Republicans and Democrats. Fiscal conservatives in the Republican Party—such as far‑right Representatives Chip Roy and Thomas Massie—expressed strong dissatisfaction with the seemingly bottomless military spending and the lack of an “exit strategy.” Democratic leader Chuck Schumer also openly opposed the proposal, saying that $200 billion would mean “a long, drawn‑out war.” Passing the funding in the Senate requires 60 votes. If the request stalls in Congress, the U.S. military’s ability to sustain operations will be directly constrained. This reflects deep domestic fear of repeating an Afghanistan‑ or Iraq‑style long war. The United States is already under immense financial pressure: the first week of the Iran war alone cost $11.3 billion. At such a high burn rate, unless the conflict quickly shifts to low‑intensity operations or a ceasefire, fiscal pressure will reach a critical point within months.

The Trump administration is also facing a crisis of legitimacy regarding the war. A recent U.S. intelligence assessment questioned the rationale behind President Trump’s decision to launch the conflict. On March 19, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated that since the devastating U.S.-Israeli airstrikes last June, Iran has not rebuilt its nuclear facilities. Her testimony publicly challenges the original justification for the war. Such internal dissent can rapidly erode the political legitimacy of the conflict. When the stated reasons for war are shown to be misleading, governments typically face intense public and legal pressure to scale back operations or declare the mission complete.

Netanyahu also claimed that fissures have emerged within Iran’s leadership: both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his son have not appeared publicly, with rumors circulating about their deaths. “Various factions are vying for power, and the situation is extremely tense,” he said. If Iran descends into civil war or a total collapse of authority, the U.S. and Israel may declare that the regime has “lost the ability to resist” and unilaterally halt large‑scale strikes. However, a power vacuum could also lead to localized guerrilla warfare and prolonged instability, forcing U.S. troops to remain longer—precisely what Representative Thomas Massie fears.

Overall, the war is unlikely to evolve into a long‑term occupation. Trump clearly prefers to achieve all major objectives—short of regime change—through high‑intensity airstrikes (destroying missile production and nuclear facilities, eliminating Iran’s air and naval forces, decapitating senior leadership), rather than becoming bogged down in an Afghanistan‑style quagmire (as evidenced by his request that Israel pause certain operations). If Netanyahu’s claim that Iran’s nuclear capability has been destroyed is accurate, the marginal utility of continuing large‑scale warfare drops sharply. Moreover, the $200 billion funding dispute signals that the financial backers of the war are not prepared to bankroll a long campaign.

Rough estimates suggest that the large‑scale airstrike phase may conclude within the next few weeks or two to three months, accompanied by some form of “victory declaration.” However, given Netanyahu’s remark that “there is still more work to be done” and the Pentagon’s future funding needs, the conflict may shift into a “long‑term high‑pressure blockade or low‑intensity precision‑strike model,” rather than a complete peace.